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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - SUIT FOR SPECIFIC RELIEF AGAINST FEDERAL 
OFFICERS - UNITED STATES NOT A NECESSARY PARTY- Plaintiff, claiming 
right to possession, brought an ejection action in a Georgia court against 
both the government officer in possession of the land and the United States. 
Defendants removed the case to a United States district court1 and moved 
for dismissal. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, 
holding that the court had no jurisdiction over the claim because the suit in 
substance and effect was against the United States and the United States had 
neither consented to be sued nor waived its immunity from suit.2 On 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, reversed, one 
judge dissenting. An action in ejectment against one who holds land to 
which plaintiff claims a possessory interest is not foreclosed because de-
fendant possesses the land as agent of the United States and the United 
States has not waived its sovereign immunity. Bowdoin v. Malone, 284 
F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1960). 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States, although 
judge-made, has been considered to be an implicit part of the United States 
Constitution.a Its early popularity4 is evidenced by the great rapidity with 
which the eleventh amendment was added to the Constitution, thereby 
giving the states immunity from suits by citizens of other states.5 The ex-
1 A civil action commenced in a state court against an officer of the United States 
may be removed by him to the District Court of the United States for the district 
embracing the place wherein the action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1958). 
2 Doe v. Roe, 186 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Ga. 1959). 
3 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934); see United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 
196, 207 (1882) (dictum). See generally Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the 
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1060 (1946). 
4 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 
419, 432 (1922). This theory has been criticized because the prevailing philosophy in 
this country is that the people and not the state are supreme. See Borchard, Govern-
mental Responsibility in Tort (pts. 5 &: 6), 36 YALE L.J. 757, 1039 (1927). A suggested 
alternative basis for the doctrine is its use as a device to prevent the courts from running 
the government. See Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against Officers for Relief Other 
Than Damages, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 3 (1954); Briggs v. Light-Boat Upper Cedar Point, 93 
Mass. 157 (1865). 
5 The eleventh amendment adopted in 1798 abrogated Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (state officers not immune from suit by a citizen of another state). 
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821), which suggests as another 
reason for the popularity of the eleventh amendment the fear that creditors of the state 
would seek to enforce state obligations in federal courts. 
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tent to which this doctrine applies in suits against government officials, as 
opposed to he United States itself, has never been entirely clear. However, 
in at least three categories of cases it has been rather consistently held that 
the court has no jurisdiction unless the United States is joined and consents 
to be sued or waives its immunity from suit:6 (I) cases in which, if specific 
relief were granted, the net effect would be to collect money from the 
public treasury;7 (2) cases in which, if specific relief were granted, the net 
effect would be to compel specific performance by the United States of a 
contract to which it was a party;s and (3) cases in which plaintiff seeks to 
compel the sovereign to part ·with property admittedly owned by the 
sovereign.o Outside of these categories the cases turn on a precarious 
balance between protection of private interests and non-interference with 
functions of government officials; however, the conclusion is rarely ex.-
plained in these terms. If the balance is weighted in favor of private pro-
tection, the result may be announced in terms that the official has acted 
beyond his statutory authority10 or that he has acted to deprive plaintiff of 
his constitutional rights.11 
A third rationale - that the official has committed a common-law tort -
has doubtful status. In the leading case of United States v. Lee12 the 
Supreme Court held that in an ejectment action against a government 
official the United States is not a necessary party and that the action may 
be maintained without waiver of sovereign immunity.13 A host of decisions 
following Lee, including Land v. Dollar14 decided in 1947, impliedly re-
o See generally Comment, 65 HARv. L. REv. 466, 469 (1952); Note, 40 GEO. L.J. 289, 
298 (1952). 
7 E.g., Mine Safety Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945) (suit to enjoin Treasury 
officials from stopping payment under one contract because of excess profits made by 
plaintiff under an earlier contract, dismissed). 
s E.g., Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918) (injunction to prevent Postmaster General 
from annulling a contract, dismissed); United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 
218 (1913) (mandamus to order Secretary of Navy to deliver cruiser pursuant to contract, 
dismissed). 
1l E.g., Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908) (injunction proceedings against 
Secretary of Interior to prevent disposition of certain government-owned lands, dismissed); 
Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906) (suit to prevent Government from patenting 
public land to Indians because land belonged to Oregon via congressional acts, dismissed). 
10 E.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. v. Fall, 259 U.S. 197 
(1922); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918); Carlson v. Washington ex rel. Curtiss, 234 
U.S. 103 (1912); Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481 (1908); American School of Magnetic Healing 
v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109 (1902); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 152 (1900). 
11 E.g., Georgia R.R.&: Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304-06 (1952); Rickert 
Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1936); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-60 (1908); 
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U.S. 270, 286, 
292 (1885); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 868-70 (1824). 
12106 U.S. 196 (1882). 
13 Id. at 220. 
14 330 U.S. 731, 737-39 (1947). In an action to restrain the chairman of the United 
States Maritime Commission and others from selling stock which they allegedly were 
illegally withholding from the plaintiff and to compel the return of the stock to the 
plaintiff, the Court held the district court had jurisdiction over the case because if de-
fendants wrongfully held the stock they would be acting beyond their statutory authority 
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affirmed the position that sovereign immunity does not extend to govern-
ment officials who have committed a tort on the basis that an agent of the 
Government committing a tort acts as an individual and not on behalf of 
the Government.15 But in 1949 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce 
Corp.16 assailed this exception to the sovereign immunity rule.11 The 
Court purported to "hold" that "if the actions of an officer do not conflict 
with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are actions of the 
sovereign, whether or not they are tortious under general law ... :•1s The 
Court explained Lee as a case involving an unconstitutional taking of 
plaintiff's land and therefore within the first exception to the sovereign 
immunity doctrine, and distinguished Dollar as a case where the govern-
ment official acted beyond his statutory authority19 and thus within the 
other exception to the doctrine. This broad language in Larson suggests 
therefore that if specific relief is sought against a government official who 
has committed a tortious act the United States will be considered an es-
sential party to the suit unless the official has acted beyond his statutory 
authority or in an unconstitutional manner.20 
or would be guilty of committing a tort and either violation would be sufficient to remove 
the case from the shield of sovereign immunity. 
15 E.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937) (threat-
ened deprivation of vested property rights in water); Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926) 
(trespass to property); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 
(1922) (conversion of property); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636 
(1911) (interference with access to navigable water); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 
(1897) (wrongful withholding of land); Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 
165 (1893) (attempt to withdraw grant of right-of-way which had become vested property 
right of the railroad). The vast amount of authority accepting the view of Lee lends 
strength to the position that sovereign immunity should not be extended to a govern-
ment officer who has committed a tortious act. 
The statement that when a government official acts either tortiously, unconstitution-
ally, or beyond his statutory authority he is acting as an individual and not as an agent 
of the Government is a mere fiction used by the Court to justify its decision that the 
Court has jurisdiction even though the United States has not been joined or consented 
to be sued. This statement begs the question whether sovereign immunity should be 
extended to all acts of government officials or whether the courts in each case must weigh 
the advantages to be derived from application of the doctrine against the private injury 
incurred. See Davis, supra note 4, at 9. 
16 337 U.S. 682 (1949). 
17 But see, id. at 705-32 (dissenting opinion). 
lSLarson v. Domestic&: Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695 (1949). Despite 
the strong language in terms of "holding," the decision actually turned on other grounds. 
See text accompanying note 24 infra. 
19 The language of the Court in Lee suggests that its holding was based primarily 
on defendant's wrongful trespass to the plaintiff's property and not their taking of 
plaintiff's property without just compensation. 106 U.S. at 220-21. The Court's distinction 
of Dollar can be criticized in that the Dollar Court indicated it would reach the same 
decision if the official had merely committed a tort and had not acted beyond his 
statutory authority. 330 U.S. at 737. 
20 See, e.g., Fay v. Miller, 183 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
1961] RECENT DECISIONS 1273 
The problem which faced the court in the principal case was whether 
the language in Larson, in effect, overruled Lee.21 The court concluded 
that Lee had not been so limited as to preclude an action seeking to oust 
the government's agents from wrongful possession of land growing out of 
their tortious or illegal acts.22 The result could have been brought within 
the exception to sovereign immunity recognized in Larson - that the action 
of the government agent in the principal case amounted to an unconstitu-
tional taking of plaintiff's land.23 Alternatively, the court could have 
avoided Larson entirely by limiting it to its facts and ignoring its sweeping 
language. Larson involved a contract for the sale of government goods 
and the action would have resulted, in effect, in a decree of specific per-
formance of a government contract, an area in which it has been consistently 
held that the suit is in reality one against the United States which cannot 
be maintained without its consent.24 The court's disparagement of the 
tortious conduct theory in Larson was thus unnecessary, but lower courts, 
understandably, have not felt free to disregard it and indeed most have 
followed the literal wording of Larson without deviation.2is 
The resulting confusion calls for a reappraisal of the entire doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. The apparent reason for the doctrine in modern law 
is to permit the Government to function unimpaired by a multitude of 
private suits against officials;2 6 but weighed against this must be the pro-
position that private individuals have rights of property and contract which 
21 One court has taken the position that Lee has been almost completely overruled: 
"[I]n my opinion, United States v. Lee has been severely limited by Larson, and with 
the possibility of the landowner recovering compensation for the wrongful taking, there 
may be no cases at all in which United States v. Lee will permit suit today." Jones v. 
United States, 127 F. Supp. 31, 33 (E.D.N.C. 1954). 
22 Principal case at 105. 
2s The Court in Larson did not question the proposition that an action could be 
maintained against a government official if his action violated plaintiff's constitutional 
rights. 337 U.S. at 689. 
24 There is a valid reason for denying a suit for specific relief against a government 
official for his tortious interference with a contract since plaintiff may sue the United 
States for damages in the Court of Claims. However, in the property cases specific relief 
to gain return of the wrongfully held property is the only adequate measure of relief, 
and that form of relief cannot be awarded by the Court of Claims. See generally Com-
ment, 65 HARv. L. REv. 466, 471 (1952). 
25 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nez Perce Tribe of Indians v. Seaton, 257 F.2d 206 
(D.C. Cir. 1958); United States v. 706.98 Acres of Land, 158 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Ark. 1958); 
Andrews v. White, 221 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1955), affirming 121 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tenn. 
1954); Hudspeth County Conservation &: Reclamation Dist. v. Robbins, 213 F.2d 425 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954); Arizona ex rel. Arizona State Bd. of Pub. 
Welfare v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Stack v. Strang, 94 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 
1950), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1951); American Dredging Co. v. 
Cochrane, 190 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But see Archbold v. McLaughlin, 181 F. Supp. 
175 (D.D.C. 1960); Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1959); McKay v. Wahlen-
maier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Farrell v. Moomau, 85 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 
1949). See generally Comment, 8 STAN. L. REv. 683, 692 (1956). 
26 See Block, supra note 3, at 1080. 
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should be protected against impairment by government agents as well as 
private citizens.27 The decisions prior to Larson, either consciously or un-
consciously, interposed the doctrine of sovereign immunity in those cases in 
which suit would have resulted in an undue restraint on the operation of 
the Government. Larson itself was not inconsistent with this pattern, but 
its sweeping language which cast doubt upon a basic rationale for avoid-
ing sovereign immunity as developed in Lee and related cases, has posed 
the threat of extending sovereign immunity to the point where the rights 
of the individual may be unduly suppressed. It is reassuring that the court 
in the principal case has concluded that the principle of Lee is still avail-
able for protection of private rights in appropriate cases, notwithstanding 
what was said in Larson. But the apparent inconsistencies between the 
theory of Lee and the language of Larson will doubtless continue to plague 
the lower courts until the Supreme Court clarifies the latter or reappraises 
the entire doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Steven P. Davis 
27 See Note, 23 So. CAL L. REv. 258, 260 (1950). 
